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Defense of the Kansas Frontier 1868-1869

by Marvin H. Garfield

November 1932 (Vol. 1, No. 5), pages 451 to 473
Transcribed by lhn; HTML editing by Tod Roberts
digitized with permission of the Kansas Historical Society.


INDIAN affairs in Kansas remained unusually quiet in the spring of 1868. Nothing of note happened until the early part of June when the Cheyennes raided Council Grove. Minor depredations occurred during July, followed by an invasion of the Saline and Solomon valleys in August. On August 23 Gen. Philip H. Sheridan ordered the Indians out of the state. While a volunteer battalion patrolled the frontier districts, Sheridan organized his regulars and carried on a fall and winter campaign into the Indian's stronghold in the Indian territory and Texas. The result was the complete subdual of the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, and Kiowa tribes. Sheridan's forces were ably assisted in this campaign by the Nineteenth Kansas volunteer cavalry.

Before entering into a discussion of the Sheridan campaign it is necessary to explain in detail the events which led up to that final crushing of the plains tribes of the Southwest. In the spring of 1868 the nomadic Indian tribes went into camp near Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, where they proceeded to draw rations from the government until the buffalo migration reached the Kansas plains. The Kiowas, Comanches and part of the Cheyennes located at Lamed, while the Arapahoes, Apaches and the remainder of the Cheyennes chose Fort Dodge. [1] During this period General Sheridan endeavored to establish a more friendly basis for Indian relations. In an effort to explain further the terms of the Medicine Lodge treaties special agents had been sent among the tribes the previous autumn. William Comstock and Abner S. Grover had gone to the Cheyennes and Richard Parr to the Kiowas and Comanches. For a time it seemed that success would crown their efforts, but by the time spring arrived it became apparent that the Cheyennes were not to be reconciled so easily. [2] Comstock and Grover were treacherously attacked, Comstock losing his life as a result. General Sheridan powwowed with the Indians at Fort Dodge, but gained little satisfaction. The young men were extremely dissatisfied with



the Medicine Lodge arrangements and were in an ugly mood. Warriors, chiefs, medicine men, all the tribal leaders, united in a demand for arms and ammunition. [3]

The problem involved was a thorny one which had remained unsolved from the previous year. In January, 1867, Gen. W. T. Sherman had ordered Gen. W. S. Hancock to stop the practice of Indian agents selling arms to the Indians. All sales by law were to be under the rigid control of the commanding officers of posts within the Indian districts. The law was being flagrantly violated, however. Sherman had threatened, consequently, to withdraw United States troops from the plains region altogether unless the unlimited and unlicensed sale of arms was stopped. [4] Sherman appealed to Ulysses S. Grant, who in turn addressed the Secretary of War urging the abolition of civil Indian agents and licensed traders. [5] Grant also had seconded Sherman's threats to withdraw the troops from the frontier. Since the arms question involved a conflict between the War Department and the Interior Department, which contained the Indian Bureau, congress became the final authority. On February 1, 1867, Sec. E. M. Stanton transmitted to the house committee on Indian affairs a letter from Major Douglas, commander at Fort Dodge. Douglas had reported that a large trading business had grown up at the fort between traders and Indians, that Butterfield, the former head of the Overland Despatch, had the largest investment of all the traders, and that several cases of arms had been sold by Butterfield to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. "Between the authorized issue of the agents and the sales of the traders," said Douglas, "the Indians were never better armed than at the present time." Continuing, the letter related that the Indians were openly boasting of their preparedness for war in the spring. Further incriminating statements were made by Major Douglas:

"The agents have no real control over the traders; in fact, they are accused by many, both Indians and white men, of being in league with them, and of drawing a large profit from the trade. The anxiety of the Indians at the present time to obtain arms and ammunition is a great temptation to the trader. For a revolver an Indian will give ten, even twenty times its value in horses and furs." [6]

It developed that Butterfield had consulted experienced Indian agents before selling arms to the Indians. William W. Bent, E. W.


Wyncoop, and Col. J. H. Leavenworth had addressed a circular letter to the new trader informing him that he was authorized to sell arms or ammunition to any Indians that were at peace with and receiving annuities from the United States. [7] Feeling that he had received official consent, Butterfield accordingly had gone ahead with his sales, since the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were receiving annuities and so were technically at peace.

While congress was debating the question in committee, the practice of evading the law had continued. Gov. S. J. Crawford, while in Washington in April, 1867, visited the Interior Department and roundly denounced it for supplying the Indians with arms and ammunition to be used against frontier people. The secretary promised that arms would not be issued to the tribes that were on the warpath. This promise was then immediately broken. [8] Indian supplies were sent to Atchison in July consigned to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes who were on the warpath. Hearing of the presence of the supply train in Kansas, Governor Crawford telegraphed General Sherman and threatened to have it burned unless the War Department prevented the supplies from reaching the Indians. Sherman therefore ordered the cavalry from Fort Riley to capture the train and store the supplies in Fort Larned. There they remained until October, when the Peace Commission distributed them to the Indians at Medicine Lodge. [9]

His indignation once aroused, Governor Crawford was relentless in his persecution of Indian traders and agents. Having learned that one of Colonel Leavenworth's traders at Wichita was supplying the Kiowas and Comanches with arms and ammunition, the governor made a public statement denouncing such practices. The trader, J. R. Mead, then wrote Crawford in an aggrieved tone, denying everything. Crawford sent a scorching reply on September 4, 1867. Extracts from the letter follow:

"You, I am informed, are one of his (Leavenworth's) traders. If such be the fact, it is doubtless to your mutual interest to cooperate with each other in explaining and covering up as far as possible the damnable outrages committed by agent traders and Indians during the present year."

The governor then proceeded to tell Mead that arms and ammunition had been passing into the Indian country all summer by way of the mouth of the Little Arkansas. Crawford warned Mead not to


ship any more arms to the Indians, and closed with this: "The Kiowa or Comanche Indian who has committed most fiendish outrages in Kansas is no worse than his agent who represents him as at peace, or the trader who furnishes him with supplies which enable him to execute his designs." [10]

With this history of the previous year as a warning, General Sheridan refused to deliver more arms to the Indians in the spring of 1868.

The month of June, 1868, brought the biggest Indian scare that Kansans ever witnessed. On June 3, citizens of Marion county and vicinity received warning that a large band of Indians was approaching. Settlers from miles around flocked into Marion Centre for protection. The Indians appeared, some three hundred strong, but passed by the frightened town without molesting it. Farm houses were ransacked and stock killed by the invaders. [11] The objective of this Cheyenne raid was the Kaw Indian reservation at Council Grove. On June 5 the Cheyennes, led by Tall Bull, arrived and attacked the Kaws. After a long-drawn-out battle in which few fatalities occurred the Cheyennes were driven off and headed westward, committing petty outrages as they went.

Instantly the entire east-central portion of the state was aroused. Armed bodies of citizens collected in Morris, Lyon, and Chase counties, but the men were entirely without organization and recognized no one as commander. [12] Not knowing where the Indians would strike next, the suspense was terrible to the people in the region. Efforts to allay their fears were made by the newspapers. It was soon discovered that the Cheyenne raid was aimed only at the Kaws, and that the motive back of it was retaliation for the death of seven Cheyennes at the hands of the Kaws the previous summer. [13]

The chief result of the raid was that the state government, in cooperation with the federal military authorities, evolved a more effective system of frontier protection. As an emergency measure General Sheridan dispatched cavalry from Forts Harker and Riley to the Council Grove vicinity. [14] On June 8 the general ordered that fifteen thousand rounds of ammunition be shipped to Governor


Crawford for distribution among the frontier settlers. [15] Four days later J. B. McAfee, adjutant general of Kansas, left Topeka in order to distribute the ammunition and arms provided by Sheridan. McAfee also had instructions to organize a company of reserve cavalry. [16]

For permanent protection of the western border Sheridan decided to organize a cavalry patrol by establishing temporary camps in the exposed region. Prior to the raid a cavalry company had been stationed at the mouth of the Little Arkansas. [17] On June 20 Sheridan informed Crawford that another company had been posted at the Kaw crossing of the Santa Fe trail on the Cottonwood river near Marion. [18] The two companies in cooperation with the troops at Fort Harker thus patrolled the border from Fort Harker south to Wichita.

These precautions were in line with the demands of the settlers of the region and did much to relieve their anxiety. The War Department also aided by issuing an order directing the commanders of departments to use their own judgment in issuing ammunition to state and territorial authorities for frontier protection. [19] It suited the people of Kansas to have this power in the hands of General Sheridan rather than the War Department, since they had great confidence in the good judgment and cooperative spirit of "Little Phil."

Tall Bull's Council Grove raid proved costly to the Cheyennes because it prevented them from collecting their annuity, arms and ammunition for a time. By the middle of July, however, the Indians appeared in large numbers at Fort Larned and threatened to storm the fort and take the arms by force. [20] Had not General Sully maintained a bold front the hostiles might have carried their threats into action. [21] Finally the tribes deserted the fort, but the general impression among the military officers was that they intended to return after placing their women and children in positions of safety. [22] Shortly afterwards the Indians came back. This time, by astute diplomacy, they were able to get the desired arms. They promised


to use the arms for hunting purposes only, claiming that they needed more ammunition in order to hunt on their way south in the autumn. Gen. Alfred Sully was completely hoodwinked by their fair promises, and accordingly issued the arms. By August 3 the last of the arms were distributed. Immediately the Indians left for parts unknown. [23]

At the first hint of trouble, Col. Thomas Murphy, superintendent of Indian affairs for the Central Superintendency, had gone to Larned to investigate the situation. He found the Indians irritable and sullen because of the nondelivery of arms and ammunition. When he left conditions were quiet. Colonel Murphy therefore was able to announce to the press on August 5 that an Indian outbreak was unlikely to occur and that the Indians were convinced of their own inability to continue hostilities against the whites. [24] While the colonel was publishing this statement a band of approximately two hundred Cheyennes was on the warpath under the command of the Dog Soldier chief, Red Nose, and The-man-who-breaks-the-marrowbones, a prominent member of Black Kettle's band. Nearly all the Cheyenne bands were represented in this war party. [25] Beginning on the Smoky Hill valley and Kansas Pacific railroad, the Indians swept northward to the Saline and thence to the Solomon and Republican valleys. In the course of a few days they had killed at least a dozen settlers, outraged several women, some of whom were carried into captivity, burned and ransacked houses, stolen stock, driven hundreds of settlers from the region and paralyzed the citizens of northern Kansas with fright. [26]

First news of the raid reached Topeka on August 15. Colonel McAfee and Governor Crawford at once hastened to the exposed regions in order to make preparations for arming and organizing the settlers for defense. Fortunately for the Asher creek settlement, Colonel McAfee had delivered them a shipment of arms before the raid. They were thus able to drive the Indians away. McAfee toured the settlements for several days, organizing, arming and providing for the destitute. [27] All attempts at pursuing the raiders


failed. Governor Crawford hastily organized a volunteer company at Salina, but it was too late to accomplish much. [28] On August 17 Crawford appealed to President Johnson for aid. In his message the governor asked not only for assistance but requested: (1) That the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Cheyennes, and Apaches be driven from Kansas; (2) That the President keep the Indian Commission at home; (3) That the government stop issuing arms and ammunition to the Indians. Crawford promised the cooperation of Kansas in any effort to drive the Indians from the state. His message was referred to General Sherman who ordered immediate action. [29] Regular troops were rushed to the scene of the raids by command of General Sheridan. Troops stationed on the Little Arkansas and detachments from Forts Riley and Harker were at once transferred to the Saline and Solomon region. [30] Sheridan then ordered General Sully to erect block houses on the Saline, Solomon, and Republican. These forts were garrisoned with infantry while the region lying between the posts was patrolled by cavalry. [31] On August 21 Sheridan informed Crawford that he would order all the Indians to their reservations. The order was issued two days later.

After a week of intense excitement Kansas realized that the worst was over. Settlers accordingly returned to their claims, and life went on as before. One beneficial result of the raid was that the settlers and the military became better prepared to withstand future Indian depredations in the region. By October the inhabitants of north-central Kansas were so destitute as a result of Indian raids and crop failures that it became necessary to send them financial relief. Various organizations in the eastern part of the state put on campaigns and raised funds to enable these pioneers to remain on their claims through the winter. [32]

Governor Crawford's appeal to the President evidently produced results. The War Department was given a free hand to prosecute the Indian war to a finish. Even the Commissioner of Indian Affairs approved of punishing the guilty. [33] The Indians in September resumed their depredations in earnest. Comanches and Kiowas made a dash at Fort Dodge on September 3, killing four


soldiers and wounding seventeen before being driven off. [34] A Mexican wagon train was attacked on the Santa Fe trail near Fort Dodge by Cheyennes and Arapahoes. Sixteen of the Mexicans were reported killed and scalped. [35] Farther north, along the Smoky Hill and South Platte, the Cheyennes pursued their methods of previous years. Great excitement prevailed in Denver, and Gov. A. C. Hunt, of Colorado, organized a volunteer company to protect the stage lines. [36]

On September 7 Sheridan ordered General Sully to invade the region south of the Arkansas river to make war on the families and run off the stock of the Cheyennes and their allies. At nearly the same time Col. George A. Forsyth was ordered to operate against the Cheyennes in the vicinity of Fort Wallace. Forsyth headed an organization of frontier scouts which was formed on August 24 by authority of General Sheridan. The scouts were all experienced plainsmen and buffalo hunters who had been recruited at Forts Harker and Wallace by Lieut. Fred Beecher. [37]

Scouts had reported to Sheridan that a band of Indians not exceeding two hundred fifty was encamped on the western frontier of Kansas. The Indians attacked a wagon train near Sheridan, on the Smoky Hill route, and fled northward. Forsyth's company at once left Fort Wallace in pursuit of the raiders. After six days marching they camped on Arickaree creek in northeastern Colorado. On the morning of September 17 the camp was attacked by a large force of Cheyennes and Sioux. For six days the little band withstood both the warriors and slow starvation until rescued by Col. John C. Carpenter and the Tenth cavalry. [38] The conflict is generally known as the Battle of Beecher's Island, in honor of Lieut. Fred Beecher, who died there.

Numerous contradictory accounts have been written of this battle. Estimates of the number of Indians vary from four hundred fifty to two thousand, while statistics on the number of Indian dead and wounded have been similarly divergent. Forsyth numbered the Indians at approximately four hundred fifty and reported that at least thirty-five were killed and many more wounded. [39] Governor Craw


ford estimated the Indians at eight hundred. [40] Newspaper accounts of the battle stated that there were from six hundred to seven hundred Indians well armed with Spencer carbines and heavy rifles. Stories written by participants in the battle differ considerably, although all agree that the Indian casualties were heavy. Tom Murphy, one of Forsyth's scouts, writing years afterwards, said that it was impossible to tell in the confusion of battle how many Indians fell. In 1870 Mr. Murphy met Phil McClosky, a trader to the Comanches, who had been with the Indians before and after the battle and had heard them discussing it. McClosky told Murphy that three hundred sixty Indians were killed on the Arickaree. [41] Another scout, Louis McLaughlin, believed that the Indian death rate must have been heavy since sixty-eight Cheyenne bodies were found by Carpenter's troops on their way to rescue Forsyth. McLaughlin stated that more Sioux than Cheyennes participated in the battle and that they lost more heavily than did their southern allies. [42] The highest statistics encountered were printed in a Kansas newspaper of comparatively recent times. This paper placed the number of Indians engaged in the battle at two thousand and estimated the dead at seven or eight hundred. [43] Standing alone against this array of figures is George Bird Grinnell's account. Mr. Grinnell has suggested that stories of the battle written by the white participants are colored by their own imaginations and is of the opinion that the Indians' accounts to him are much more reliable. According to the Cheyenne version, which Grinnell relates, there were about six hundred Indians in the battle and only nine killed. The Cheyennes have even gone so far as to name the Indians who fell. [44]

While it seems almost impossible to decide between such conflicting statements, a bit of logic may help solve the problem. Obviously the Indians must have numbered between four hundred fifty and eight hundred since most of the estimates range thereabouts. It is infringing upon a person's credulity, however, to state that several hundred Indians fell in the conflict. Equally ridiculous is it to maintain that fifty sharp-shooting plainsmen, armed with seven-shot repeaters, could kill only nine Indians in six days of battle and siege. As a consequence, until some better proof to the contrary can be


furnished, the official report of Colonel Forsyth sounds most plausible. The chief value of Forsyth's victory is that it broke up a large concentration of Indians which otherwise might have done considerable damage to overland travel and the frontier settlements in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado.

While Forsyth and his men were on the march toward the Arickaree, preparations were being made in Kansas for a strong offensive against the Indian strongholds to the south. In order to invade the Indian country with any sizable force it was necessary to relieve many of the regulars who were engaged in patrol and scout duty. To meet this need the First Frontier battalion was organized from the militia of Kansas. For some time Governor Crawford had been urging General Sheridan to accept a battalion of militia for frontier duty, but up to September 11, 1868, his offers had been rejected. [45] On September 9 Sheridan had sent a long telegram to Crawford announcing Sully's movements south of the Arkansas and once more refusing the militia battalion. Sheridan said that he was not yet convinced there was a necessity for such troops, but that if he discovered his regulars were insufficient he would call upon Crawford for aid. In the meantime he asked that the people of Kansas have more patience and their Indian troubles would be settled permanently. It was impossible, Sheridan added, to protect every house and person on the frontier. Small parties of whites who carelessly exposed themselves to danger would have to take the consequences. [46]

Sheridan apparently changed his mind about the militia battalion following fresh Indian disturbances, since he finally acquiesced to Crawford's plan. On September 11 the governor had telegraphed Sheridan as follows:

"Will you issue to me five hundred stand of Spencer carbines with accoutrements and ammunition? If so, and you will supply rations, I will at once organize a battalion of picked men well mounted to guard the border from the Republican to the Arkansas." [47]

In his acceptance Sheridan stated that Crawford's proposition would enable him to use seven companies of regulars who had been patrolling the frontier. [48] Adjutant General McAfee on September 15 informed Governor Crawford that Sheridan would order the


guns from Fort Leavenworth and sixty days' rations from Fort Harker to be sent immediately to Salina, where the battalion was to organize. He added that Sheridan wanted the battalion in the field as soon as possible, since the seven companies of regular soldiers were needed on the plains at once. [49] The next day Governor Crawford issued his proclamation for volunteers. Instructions were telegraphed to recruiting officers. Organization plans called for five companies of cavalry to enlist for three months' service with possibilities of only sixty days' service required. Each recruit was expected to furnish his own horse. Guns and ammunition were to be supplied by the United States through General Sheridan. [50] After assembling at Saliva, the headquarters for arms, supplies, and enlistments, the companies were ordered to their respective stations. One company each was stationed in the following localities: Lake Sibley, Solomon Valley, Saliva, Marion Centre, and Topeka. [51] The Topeka company was evidently held in reserve to reinforce the troops at other points. The period from the sixteenth to the twenty-eighth of September was spent in preparation. Before the battalion was fully recruited and outfitted a call came from Sheridan to send the first company organized to the southwest frontier. Reports had reached Sheridan that a war party of Cheyennes and Arapahoes had crossed the Arkansas east of the Great Bend. [52] Shortly afterwards Crawford was notified by Sheridan that the supposed Indian raid was a false report. [53] On September 26 Sheridan wired Crawford to relieve his troops on the Saline and Republican as soon as possible. [54] Two days later the first militia company marched away to the southwest. The other soon followed, and they assumed their respective positions along the line of patrol which extended from Nebraska south to Wichita. Good work was performed by this frontier battalion. No Indian depredations were committed during its sixty days of service except for one small raid on the Solomon in which four men were killed, one wounded, and a woman taken captive.

After sixty days' rations had been consumed, Adjutant General McAfee asked Sheridan if he wanted the battalion disbanded. Sheridan replied that he would ask authority for more rations.


Soon after, however, he left Fort Hays to take the field against the Indians. Upon referring the question to General Sherman, McAfee received a refusal; consequently the Frontier battalion was ordered home by Colonel McAfee in the latter part of November. Many of the soldiers were wholly destitute of winter clothing and both horses and men were near starvation when mustered out. [55] It was really unnecessary to keep the men in service any longer, since by November the Indians had practically withdrawn from the state and Sheridan was carrying the war to them in a winter campaign. Many of the men in the battalion, however, seemed to think otherwise. On November 26, Gov. Nehemiah Green, who had succeeded Crawford, received a petition from members of the battalion near Salina. Permission was asked of the governor to retain one hundred men for a period of thirty more days with authority to drive all Indian hostiles outside the state. The petition further requested that they be rationed by the state and allowed to retain their arms. The reason given for this desire to extend their time of service was that four hundred Cheyennes and Arapahoes were in the Saline valley. [56]

Colonel McAfee, in order to fulfill this request, called upon the post adjutant at Fort Harker to issue more rations. His suggestion was promptly rejected by the adjutant, who stated that the issuance of rations to state militia was unauthorized and could not be complied with. [57] State officials seemed willing to keep the militia out as long as the United States government furnished the rations. On the other hand, when the burden of rationing the troops fell to the lot of the state treasury the Indian danger at once became negligible and the militia was withdrawn.

It is extremely doubtful if the Indians reported on the Saline were Cheyennes and Arapahoes. It is even possible that there were no Indians in that region at the time. One month previous, Maj. George B. Jenness, of the Frontier battalion, had reported that the only hostile Indians remaining in northwestern Kansas were the Sioux on the Republican river, all Cheyenne and Arapahoe bands having gone into winter quarters.5 [8]

[The] last big Indian fight of the year in Kansas occurred on October 18, when Colonel Carpenter and the Tenth cavalry ex


changed blows with a large party of Cheyennes and Arapahoes near Buffalo Station, sixty miles west of Fort Hays. Nine Indians were killed and thirty wounded. Carpenter's losses were three wounded. [59] On October 30 Indians derailed six cars of a Kansas Pacific excursion train near Grinnell, Kan., but no one was hurt. Colored troops charged on the Indians and drove them away. [60]

Sheridan's winter campaign against the Cheyennes had been foreshadowed on September 11 when he called upon Governor Crawford for the Frontier battalion. It was also predicted by General Sherman in the following prophetic statement: "When winter starves their [the Indians'] ponies, they will want a truce and shan't have it, unless the civil influence compels me again as it did last winter." [61] General Sully's September campaign south of the Arkansas had not succeeded in crushing the Indians. In fact, Sully himself was hard pressed before he managed to get back to Fort Dodge. Gen. W. B. Hazen at Fort Larned attempted on September 19 and 20 to come to terms with the Kiowas and Comanches, but he failed to secure either peace or their removal to their reservation. [62] The Indians "worked" Hazen, as they previously had hoodwinked Sully, and obtained arms and ammunition with which they promptly took the warpath. [63] Continued Indian depredations after Sheridan had ordered the Indians out of Kansas exasperated the military authorities, Sherman finally authorizing Sheridan to proceed on a winter offensive.

On October 8 Sheridan informed Governor Crawford of his recent orders and called upon Kansas for a regiment of volunteer cavalry to serve six months. [64] The Indian Peace Commission having sustained the war policy, military preparations could go forward without fear of interruption. [65] Sheridan's plans for the Kansas volunteers were that the cavalry should muster in Topeka and march overland to Camp Supply, in Indian territory, where they were to unite with Sheridan's forces from Fort Hays and Fort Dodge. Upon receipt of Sheridan's request Governor Crawford issued a proclamation calling for volunteers.


The response was instantaneous. Letters and telegrams came from all over the state offering services of officers and men. [66] On October 20, 1868, company A was mustered in at Topeka. Other companies were rapidly added to the ranks until the regiment was complete. On November 4 Governor Crawford resigned his office to take command of the expedition. [67] The next day the Nineteenth Kansas cavalry began the long trek across the plains to meet Sheridan. The regiment reached Camp Supply on November 26, after suffering great hardships. Freezing weather and lack of food killed many of their horses; consequently nearly half the regiment finished the campaign as infantry. Before the Nineteenth arrived Gen. George A. Custer, with his Seventh cavalry, had advanced southward to the Washita river and destroyed Black Kettle's Cheyenne village. [68]

Custer's work on the Washita was but a part of the campaign plan of Sheridan. The entire plan called for the concerted operation of three separate columns of troops from Fort Hays, Kan., Fort Lyon, Colo., and Fort Bascom, New Mex. Col. A. W. Evans, with six cavalry troops and two infantry companies, was to leave Fort Bascom and work down the Canadian river. Gen. E. A. Carr and seven troops of Fifth cavalry were scheduled to march southeast from Fort Lyon to the North Canadian. Sheridan, with the main force, expected to strike the Indian villages along the Washita river. The three columns planned to converge and punish the Indians in a series of decisive engagements. The aims of the campaign were to force the Indians on their reservations and, if that failed, to show them that they would have no security winter or summer unless they respected the laws of peace and humanity. [69]

The battle of the Washita has received so much publicity that only the main facts of the affair need be told. On the morning of November 27, after having followed the trail of a returning war party, Custer's men surrounded the sleeping village. At dawn the charge was sounded and the cavalry swept down upon the surprised Indians, driving them from their tepees. The Cheyennes never had a chance and were badly beaten. Black Kettle, their chief, fell at


the first onslaught. Custer's men destroyed the village and killed the captured pony herd. Unknown to Custer, the entire valley below the Cheyenne village was full of Indians-Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches. These Indians, hearing the sounds of battle, came to the rescue of their Cheyenne friends. Seeing such overwhelming numbers arriving, Custer very prudently withdrew and marched back to Camp Supply. Statistics of the battle are greatly at variance. In his report Custer stated that one hundred three warriors were killed and fifty-three women and children captured. The Indians themselves told Gen. B. H. Grierson in 1869 that the Cheyenne loss was thirteen men, sixteen women, and nine children. [70] Custer's own losses were nineteen killed and thirteen wounded. [71]

Much controversy has existed since the Washita battle as to whether or not Black Kettle's band deserved what befell them. Sheridan himself thought that Black Kettle deserved what he got since he had freely encouraged the Saline and Solomon raids, even though he did not personally participate in them . [72] In his report to the Secretary of War Sheridan referred to the Cheyenne chief in the following uncomplimentary fashion:

"Black Kettle, . . . a worn-out and worthless old cypher, was said to be friendly; but when I sent him word to come to Dodge before any of the troops had commenced operations, saying that I would feed and protect himself and family, he refused, . . . He was also with the band on Walnut creek, where they made their medicine, or held their devilish incantations previous to the party setting out to massacre the settlers." [73]

Other references to Black Kettle have been more kindly. William Windom, of Minnesota, during debate in the house of representatives, mentioned "Black Kettle and his friendly band." [74] George Bird Grinnell has cited Black Kettle as a fine example of a patriot and has eulogized him in these words: "Black Kettle was a striking example of a consistently friendly Indian, who, because he was friendly and because his whereabouts was usually known, was punished for the acts of people whom it was supposed he could control." [75]

J. R. Mead, writing in the Wichita Eagle many years after the battle, called the Washita affair a massacre of innocent Indians. The writer declared that Black Kettle was not a hostile and never


had been, that General Hazen had given the chief a letter guaranteeing him and his band protection, and that when William Griffenstein, a friendly trader and afterwards mayor of Wichita, accused Sheridan of striking a camp of friendly Indians he was ordered out of the Indian territory by Sheridan and threatened with hanging if he returned. [76]

The best statement on the mooted question has been offered by George Bent, the half-breed Cheyenne. Bent said that Black Kettle himself was friendly, but that the Cheyenne raiders on the Saline and Solomon joined Black Kettle's camp, making it appear that the band was hostile. [77] Little Raven, an Arapahoe chief, testified on April 9,1869, before General Grierson that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes did not understand where their reservation was located. The Arapahoe chieftain thought Custer's attack was due to the fact that the Indians were off their reservation. [78]

On December 7 Sheridan's entire force left Camp Supply and advanced to the Washita. Upon their approach the Indians broke camp and fled, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes retreating southward while the Kiowas and Comanches headed for the Wichita mountains. Sheridan followed the latter group after having thoroughly explored the site of the Washita battlefield. [79] The expedition overtook the fleeing Indians on December 17 near Fort Cobb. While preparing to strike the Kiowa village, Sheridan was stopped by a message sent from Fort Cobb by General Hazen. The latter informed Sheridan that the Indians had surrendered to the Interior Department and that they were not hostile. [80] Once more the conflict of authority between the War and Interior Departments prevented decisive military action. Sheridan was very angry at Hazen for interfering because he believed that the Kiowas richly deserved a severe trouncing. [81] Hazen, of course, was acting under orders, since he had been detailed by both the War Department and the Indian Bureau to take charge of the arrangements for bringing about peace and putting the Kiowa and Comanche Indians on their reservation. The difficulty was that Hazen's and Sheridan's instructions were not in harmony. Hazen had regarded the Cheyennes and


Arapahoes only as being hostile. He had therefore refused to allow them to come in to Fort Cobb and make peace, although Black Kettle and a delegation had appeared for that purpose shortly before Custer's attack. [82]

Although professing friendship, the wily Kiowas and Comanches endeavored to escape Sheridan and flee southward. By a bit of stratagem Sheridan prevented this and managed to accomplish a complete surrender. Sheridan's method was quite simple but effective. It consisted of capturing Satanta and Lone Wolf, the principal Kiowa chiefs, and threatening to hang them. [83]

The backbone of the Indian rebellion was broken on December 25 when Colonel Evans completely crushed the last hostile band of Comanches on the Canadian river. This had its effect upon the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes who were still at large. At midnight on December 31 a delegation of chiefs from these tribes came into Fort Cobb begging for peace. They reported that their tribes were in mourning for their losses . . . their people starving, ponies dying, dogs all eaten up, no buffalo. Sheridan accepted their unconditional surrender and decided to punish them justly. "I can scarcely make error in any punishment awarded, for all have blood upon their hands," he firmly asserted. [84]

The year thus ended with fair prospects of the Indian wars in Kansas soon coming to a close. In the meantime Governor Green of Kansas had appealed to General Sully to place a permanent patrol of troops on the Saline and Solomon. Sully answered by sending one hundred fifty regulars to the region and promised to keep men there in the future. [85] No outbreaks occurred in that section until the following spring. The close of the year found the Nineteenth Kansas cavalry in good condition with forty-six officers and 1,112 men on duty. [86]


Throughout the winter months of the new year Sheridan's campaign continued. By the end of March the Indians had all been forced upon their reservations and the war was practically over so far as the southern tribes were concerned. There still remained in


Kansas the danger of depredations from the Sioux, Northern Cheyenne and Dog Soldier bands, who usually spent part of each year hunting buffalo along the Smoky Hill and Republican. As a consequence, renewed outbreaks occurred and Governor Harvey was compelled to follow the example of Crawford in calling out a militia battalion for frontier duty. Pawnees and Osages also gave some trouble. In general, though, the Indian raids were much less serious than those of 1864 to 1868.

Sheridan remained camped at Fort Cobb for several weeks, after which he moved farther south to the Wichita mountains. Near the latter he established Fort Sill. The Cheyennes had not remained true to their peace pledge. Part of them and nearly all of the Arapahoes gave themselves up, but Little Robe and the remainder of the tribe refused to come in. With this band were two captive white women, victims of the Saline-Solomon raids of the previous summer. Sheridan and Custer were especially anxious to recover these unfortunate captives.

On March 2, 1869, the Seventh cavalry and the Nineteenth Kansas cavalry left Fort Sill under the respective commands of Gen. Geo. A. Custer and Col. Horace L. Moore, who had succeeded Governor Crawford in February. The object of the expedition was to recapture the captive women and force Little Robe's band into submission. After an exhausting pursuit the Cheyennes were overtaken near the Staked Plains of Texas. Instead of destroying the Indians, as could easily have been done, Custer used diplomacy in order to recapture the women. By a repetition of Sheridan's "hang man" stunt, Custer frightened the chiefs into ordering the release of the women. Little Robe's band then surrendered and returned to Camp Supply. [87]

This affair closed the winter campaign. General Sheridan was called to Washington to become commander of the Military Division of the Missouri in place of Sherman, who had been appointed general in chief of the United States army upon Grant's vacating that office for the presidency. In his report of the campaign Sheridan was able to say that all objectives had been accomplished. This meant that punishment had been inflicted, property destroyed, the Indians disabused of the idea that winter would bring security, and all tribes south of the Platte forced upon their reservations. [88]


When Gen. J. M. Schofield succeeded Sheridan as commander of the Department of the Missouri on March 20, 1869, the winter campaign had practically ended and the troops were en route to their usual stations. [89] The Nineteenth Kansas was ordered to Fort Hays on March 31, and was mustered out April 18. Only one man of the regiment was killed in service. [90]

Indian affairs by this time were fairly well settled. The Arapahoes were located at Camp Supply in complete submission. The Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches were on their reservation. The Cheyennes had promised to make their submission in a short time, but dissension was rife in their ranks. The Dog Soldier bands under Tall Bull refused to make peace, whereas the majority of the tribe had tasted enough of war and favored accepting the reservation. As a consequence the tribe divided, Tall Bull and 250 warriors with their families joining the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes on the Republican, while Little Robe and the greater part of the tribe remained in Indian territory and were ultimately provided with a reservation in the vicinity of Camp Supply. [91]

Tall Bull and his cohorts on the Republican were not content to let matters rest. On May 21, 1869, Sioux and Cheyennes made a raid in Republic county, killing thirteen persons and taking two women and a child captive. [92] On May 29 Indians attacked the Kansas Pacific railroad near Fossil creek. Two miles of track were torn up, a train was ditched and traffic held up for nearly a day. [93] The next day the Saline valley was victim of a raid nearly identical to that of May 21. Thirteen people were killed and wounded and two more women were captured. [94]

General Custer immediately left Fort Hays in pursuit, but failed to catch the Indians. It remained for Major General Carr to administer the final blow to Tall Bull's band. Carr with his Fifth cavalry had been operating under Gen. C. C. Augur in the Platte division of the Department of the Missouri. On July 11, Carr with seven companies of cavalry and one hundred fifty Pawnee scouts under Major North, completely destroyed Tall Bull's village at Summit Springs, Colo. Tall Bull was killed and his band nearly


annihilated. [95] Hearing of this, the Cheyennes in Indian territory hastened to Fort Supply to make peace. The remnants of Tall Bull's tribe drifted in later and begged for peace. As a result there were no hostile Indians left on the plains of Kansas and Colorado. [96]

While the Nineteenth cavalry had been pursuing Little Robe's band in Texas, Indian affairs in Kansas were not entirely quiet. In January General Sully warned Gov. James M. Harvey that hostile Indians had recently been seen near Hays. Sully believed that the exposed settlers should be warned. He added that all of his spare cavalry was engaged in patrol duty on the Saline and Solomon, but that more had been applied for. [97] Indians also were reported in February on the Smoky Hill west of Junction City. [98] Governor Harvey accordingly warned the settlements and ordered various frontiersmen to raise squads of scouts for defense. Colonel McAfee hastened towards the frontier to make arrangements for supplying these scouts with rations. [99] Adjutant General McKeever, of Fort Leavenworth, on February 27 issued three thousand rounds of ammunition to Governor Harvey for distribution among frontier settlers. [100]

The Kansas state legislature took action in February and passed two measures for frontier protection. The first of these authorized the governor to call into immediate active service not more than two hundred state militia to be stationed at the most exposed points. To meet the expense of supplying this group of militia an act was passed providing for the issuance and sale of state bonds. Both of these acts were approved by Governor Harvey on February 26. [101]

After the Indian raids of May and June, the militia was again called into service. Four companies and a detachment were mustered in during July and stationed on the northwestern frontier. The Second Frontier battalion, as it was called, served until November 20, 1869, when the final muster out occurred. Although originally organized with a roll of eleven officers and three hundred enlisted men, the number was gradually reduced as the Indian danger diminished. Only one hundred fifteen remained at the final muster. [102]


The four companies were located as follows: Company A at Spillman creek, Saline valley; Company B at Plum creek, Solomon valley; Company C at Fisher creek, Solomon valley; Company D at the forks of Beaver creek and Republican river. The troops patrolled the border line effectively, but never came into contact with any large numbers of Indians. This was the last militia battalion ever called out to defend the Kansas frontier. [103]

Before the organization of the Second Frontier battalion Adjutant General Moorehouse had called into service several companies of regular militia. These were ordered by Governor Harvey to cooperate with the United States cavalry on the Solomon river following an Indian attack near Minneapolis in June. [104] Light artillery from Fort Riley was also mounted and armed as cavalry at the request of the governor. The artillery men performed quite efficiently. [105]

In addition to its troubles with the savage plains tribes Kansas suffered at the hands of its own reservation Indians. Numerous complaints reached Governor Harvey concerning petty depredations of Pawnees, Otoes and Osages. One Junction City citizen wanted the "scalawag Pawnees and Otoes" to be warned to keep clear of all settlements during times of Indian hostility because all Indians looked alike to white men and many of these "friendlies" were being killed as a result. [106] Cowley county settlers petitioned Harvey to protect them from Osages, who had driven off stock, burned a store, confiscated settlers' claims, and in general acted arrogantly toward the white men in the region. [107] Osages were also driving settlers off the Osage neutral lands during the year. [108]

In order to repay in a measure the Kansas settlers who had suffered at the hands of the Indians, the state legislature in 1869 passed an act providing for a commission to investigate and allow claims of citizens for damages done by Indians in 1867-1868. [109] The commission visited Ellsworth, Saline, Ottawa, Cloud and Mitchell counties and allowed a total of one hundred twenty claims


for an aggregate of $58,944.34. The number of offenses charged to various Indian tribes were as follows: Cheyennes, seventy-seven; Sioux, thirty-four; Pawnee, fifteen; Kiowa, nine; Arapahoe, seven; Comanche, one. In its tour of investigation the commission found many claims abandoned and fields deserted. In concluding its report the commission urged that all Indian tribes be excluded from the state, adding that until such measures were taken there could be no permanent feeling of security on the frontier. [110] The claims audited by the commission were referred to congress for final payment.

Kansas in addition carried on some relief work in cooperation with the United States army. In February General Sully rationed the destitute settlers of the Saline and Solomon regions and then informed Governor Harvey of his investigations. [111] General Sherman also sent an inspector to the locality, who in turn reported to the Kansas governor. In this report Gen. N. H. Davis , assistant inspector general of the Department of the Missouri, announced that the government had provided for the immediate wants of the settlers by issuing food and clothing. The settlers, however, were in great need of seed wheat, which the military authorities were unable to furnish; consequently he appealed to Governor Harvey to furnish it. [112] As a result the Kansas state legislature on March 1 passed an act authorizing the governor to purchase and distribute $15,000 worth of seed wheat to the destitute frontier citizens. The counties affected by the act were Clay, Cloud, Ellsworth, Lincoln, Marion, Mitchell, McPherson, Jewell, Ottawa, Republic, Saline and Washington. [113]

War Department statistics for the years 1868-1869 indicated that these two years were the worst in the history of plains warfare in the Department of Missouri. Indian depredations for the period ran as follows: One hundred fifty-eight people murdered; sixteen wounded; forty-one scalped; fourteen women outraged; one man, four women, and seven children captured; twenty-four houses attacked and burned; twelve stage coaches attacked and impeded; four wagon trains destroyed; and eighteen Indians killed in these attacks. Statistics on conflicts between the Indians and the military were as follows: Number of engagements, eleven; total number of


soldiers killed, thirty-five; total number of soldiers wounded, forty-nine; Indians killed, two hundred ninety-one; Indians wounded, two hundred fifty. [114] With the close of this period the worst Indian troubles in Kansas had ended, although the years that followed brought their toll of death and destruction to the venturesome pioneers of the Jayhawk state.


1. S. J. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, p. 287.
2. C. C. Rister, The Southwestern frontier, p. 106.
3. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, p. 288.
4. House Miscellaneous Documents. 40, 39 Cong., 2 sess., Sherman to Hancock, January 26, 1867.
5. Ibid., Grant to Stanton, February 1, 1867.
6. Ibid., No. 41, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
7. This letter was inclosed by Sherman to Grant, Ibid., 40, 39 Cong., 2 sess.
8. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties. 249, 250.
9. Ibid. 251.
10. Correspondence of Kansas Governors, Crawford (Copy Book), pp. 54-57. Archives, Kansas Historical Society. Hereafter cited C. K. G., Crawford (Copy Book).
11. Bulletin from Cottonwood Falls, June 3, 1868, in Kansas State Record, Topeka, June 6, 1868.
12. Ibid., June 7, 1868.
13. Ibid., editorial.
14. Sheridan to Crawford, June 5, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), p. 75.
15. Ibid., Sheridan to Ward Burlingame, June 8, 1868, p. 76.
16. Daily Kansas State Record, Topeka, June 12, 1868.
17. Sheridan to Crawford, May 27, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), p. 73.
18. Telegram, Sheridan to Crawford, cited by the Daily Kansas State Record, June 20, 1868.
19. Letter from War Department to Sen. E. G. Ross, of Kansas, June 19, 1868, Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1868 (Kansas), Archives, Kansas Historical Society.
20. Daily Kansas State Record, July 21, 1868.
21. Atchison Daily Free Press, July 27, 1868.
22. Ibid.
23. Major Wyncoop, Indian agent at Fort Larned, has stated that the arms were delivered on August 9. He also maintained that the war party which committed the Saline-Solomon raid left Larned before the arms were issued. Not knowing of the issue they were angry because the government had not given them their promised weapons. See correspondence upon this subject in Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1868, p. 70. See, also, Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, v. II, p. 289 ; Rister, The Southwestern Frontier, p. 107.
24. Atchison Daily Free Press, August 5, 1868.
25. Testimony of Edmund Guerriere, half-breed Cheyenne, Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 47.
26. Daily Kansas State Record, August 15-19, 1868.
27. Ibid.
28. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, p. 290.
29. Ibid., 30. Adjutant General's Report, 1868 (Kansas), p. 7; Daily Kansas State Record, August 19, 1868.
31. Sheridan to Crawford, August 21, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), p. 69.
32. Daily Kansas State Record, October 8, 1868.
33. Ibid., August 26, 1868.
34. Ibid., September 8, 1868.
35. Ibid., September 10, 1868.
36. Ibid., news dispatch from Denver, August 29, 1868.
37. Winfield Freeman, "The Battle of the Arickaree," Kansas Historical Collections, v. VI, p. 347.
38. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, pp. 295, 296.
39. Forsyth to Colonel Bankhead, commander at Fort Wallace, September 19, 1868. Cited by Mrs. Frank C. Montgomery in "Fort Wallace and Its Relation to the Frontier," Kansas Historical Collections, v. XVII, pp. 189-283.
40. Kansas in the Sixties, p. 294.
41. Indian Depredations and Battles (Clippings), v. III, p. 16, Kansas Historical Society.
42. Topeka State Journal, September 8, 1907.
43. The Kinsley Graphic, December 13, 1928.
44. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, pp. 281, 282.
45. Possibly Crawford was influenced by a letter from Major Armes, of Sheridan's staff, who secretly informed him that Sheridan was short of regulars and needed the aid of Kansas volunteers. -- Armes to Crawford, September 8, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford. (Incoming letters.)
46. C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), p. 98.
47. Ibid., p. 154.
48. Ibid., p. 97.
49. Ibid., p. 82.
50. Crawford's instructions to recruiting officers, ibid., p. 149.
51. Daily Kansas State Record, Topeka, September 16, 1868. 52. Sheridan to Crawford, September 21, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams), p. 83.
53. Ibid., p. 84.
54. Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1868 (Kansas).
55. Adjutant General's Report, 1868, pp. 9, 10.
56. Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1868 (Kansas).
57. Ibid., letter from Post Adjutant Gardner to Colonel McAfee.
58. Major Jenness to Colonel McAfee, October 26, 1868, C. K. G., Crawford (Incoming letters).
59. Daily Kansas State Record, Topeka, October 24, 1868; The Times and Conservative, Leavenworth, October 27, 1868.
60. The Times and Conservative, October 31, 1868.
61. w. T. Sherman to Sen. John Sherman, September 23, 1868, The Sherman Letters (edited by Raphael Sherman Thorndike), p. 322.
62. Sheridan to Crawford, October 8, 1868, C. K. G , Crawford (Telegrams), p. 87.
63. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, pp. 318, 319.
64. Sheridan to Crawford, October 8, 1868, C'. K. G., Crawford (Telegrams).
65. Sheridan to Crawford, October 9, 1868, ibid., p. 88.
66. Governor Crawford's correspondence in the archives of the Kansas Historical Society contain seventy-four letters from men in twenty-three different counties all of which were offers to serve in the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer cavalry.
67. Crawford responded to a popular demand on the part of the officers and men of the regiment. Many of his personal friends advised him against taking the position. Daily Kansas State Record, Topeka.
68. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, p. 325.
69. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, v. II, pp. 307-309; Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 45.
70. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 289.
71. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, v. II, p. 314.
72. Ibid., p. 318.
73. Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 47.
74. Congressional Globe, House proceedings, 1869, 40 Cong., 3 sess., p. 683.
75. The Fighting Cheyennes, p. 298.
76. The Wichita Daily Eagle, March 2, 1893. (It is of interest to know that the writer of this article, J. R. Mead, was the Indian trader at Wichita who was accused by Governor Crawford in 1867 of having sold arms and ammunition to hostile Indians.)
77. "Forty Years With the Cheyennes," The Frontier, March, 1906.
78. Report of the Secretary of the Interior, House Executive Documents, 41 Con., 2 sess., v. III, p. 524.
79. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, pp. 326-328.
80. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, v. II, p. 323.
81. Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 49.
82. On this occasion Black Kettle and the other chiefs said they wanted war with Kansas but peace at Fort Cobb; i. e., war in summer and peace in winter. -- Hazen's report to Sherman, June 30, 1869, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1869, p. 390.
83. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, v. II, p. 335.
84. News dispatch of Sheridan's report to Sherman dated January 16, 1869, printed in the Kansas State Record, Topeka, January 20, 1869.
85. Kansas State Record, Topeka, December 30, 1868.
86. Ibid.
89. Schofield's report to the Secretary of War, October 23, 1869, in Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 67.
90. Wilder, Annals of Kansas, p. 502.
91. Schofield's report, pp. 67, 68.
92. Wilder, Annals of Kansas, pp. 502, 503.
93. Indian history (miscellaneous collection of MSS, Archives, Kansas Historical Society).
94. Adjutant General's Report, 1869 (Kansas), p. 7.
87. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, v. II, pp. 344, 345 ; Horace L. Moore, "The Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry," Kansas Historical Collections, v. VI, pp. 44-47 ; Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, pp. 330-335.
88. Moore, op. cit.
95. George Bird Grinnell, Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion, pp. 196-202.
96. Schofield's report, Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., p. 68.
97. Sulley to Governor Harvey, January 18, 1869, 1869 (Kansas).
98. Kansas State Record, Topeka, February 3, 1869.
99. Ibid., January 20, 1869.
100. Order from McKeever to commander at Fort Leavenworth, Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1869 (Kansas).
101. House Journal, Kansas State Legislature, 1869, pp. 722, 784, 786, 866, 917; Laws of Kansas, 1869, p. 16.
102. Adjutant General's Report, 1869, p. 7.
103. A. T. Andreas, History of Kansas, p. 211.
104. Governor Harvey to Colonel Moorehouse, June 13, 1869, Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1869 (Kansas).
105. Ward Burlingame to General Pope, May 20, 1870, C. K. G., Harvey (Letterpress books), Archives, Kansas Historical Society. (Burlingame mentioned the use of artillerymen as cavalry in 1869 and wanted Pope to permit it again in 1870.)
106. S. D. Houston to Governor Harvey, February 19, 1869, C. K. G., Harvey (Incoming letters).
107. Petition of fifty-five settlers of Cowley county, Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1869.
108. Letter from Joe M. Culver, citizen of Montgomery county, ibid.
109. Laws of Kansas, 1869, pp. 201-204.
110. Report of the commission to Governor Harvey, August, 1869, House Miscellaneous Documents, No. 20, 41 Cong., 2 sess.
111. Sulley to Harvey, February 12 and 18, 1869, C. K. G., Harvey (Incoming letters).
112. Davis to Harvey, February 25, 1869, Ibid.
113. Laws of Kansas, 1869, pp. 262-264.
114. Report of the Secretary of War, 41 Cong., 2 sess., v. II, Part I, pp. 52-55.